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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After a jury trial, Spencer Alexander Jarrett was found guilty of one count of sexual
abuse of a child under the age of sixteen, and two counts of possession of sexually exploitative
material.  For the sexual abuse charge, the district court imposed a sentence of fifteen years, with
five years fixed.  For the possession counts, the district court imposed two concurrent sentences
of ten years, with five years fixed, and ordered that those sentences run concurrent to the
sentence in the sexual abuse case.  On appeal, Mr. Jarrett asserts that the district court abused its
discretion by imposing excessive sentences.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
In May of 2016, Erika Wonacott reported to law enforcement that her daughter, M.W.,
was being enticed by an adult male by phone, text, and social media.  (Presentence Report
(hereinafter, PSI), p.3.)1  M.W. subsequently told authorities that she and her friend, T.S., were
engaging in an online relationship with an adult they knew as “Alex.”  (PSI, p.3.)  M.W. said that
Alex wanted to meet her and had masturbated on the phone with her.  (PSI, p.3.)  Mr. Jarrett was
identified by his Facebook profile and his phone number, which his parole officer confirmed.
(PSI, p.3.)
A forensic data extraction of Mr. Jarrett’s phone, and the phones of M.W. and T.S.,
revealed phones calls to and from Mr. Jarrett and M.W. and text messages regarding sexual
activity.  (PSI, p.3.)  Images of T.S.’s nude breast and vagina were found on Mr. Jarrett’s phone,
and T.S. confirmed that she had sent the pictures to Mr. Jarrett.   (PSI,  p.3.)   T.S. said she had
phone sex with Mr. Jarrett and told him that she was 13 years old.  (PSI, p.3.)  She estimated that
she had spoken with Mr. Jarrett over 100 times on the phone and said that Mr. Jarrett had told
her he was 18, and then later said he was 17.  (PSI, p.3.)
Mr. Jarrett was charged, by indictment, with one count of sexual abuse of a child under
the  age  of  sixteen  years  for  soliciting  T.S.  to  participate  in  sexual  acts,  and  two  counts  of
possession of sexually exploitative material for possessing the pictures of T.S.  (R., pp.23-25.)
Mr. Jarrett proceeded to trial and was found guilty on all counts.  (R., pp.176-77, 189.)  At the
sentencing hearing, the State requested that the district court impose a sentence of twenty years,
with seven years fixed, for the sexual abuse charge.  (4/18/17 Tr., p.7, Ls.13-16.)  The State did
not make a specific recommendation regarding the other charges but stated that it would not
1 All citations to the PSI and its attachments refer to the 175-page electronic document.
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object if those sentences were run concurrent to the sentence for sexual abuse.  (4/18/17 Tr., p.7,
Ls.16-17.)  Mr. Jarrett’s counsel requested that the district court impose an underlying sentence
of six years, with three years fixed, and place Mr. Jarrett on probation.  (4/18/17 Tr., p.10, Ls.17-
19.)  In the alternative, he asked that the district court consider retaining jurisdiction so that
Mr. Jarrett could participate in a rider program.  (4/18/17 Tr., p.10, Ls.19-24.)  The district court
imposed a sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed, for the sexual abuse charge, and two
concurrent sentences of ten years, with five years fixed, for the possession of sexually
exploitative material charges.  (4/18/17 Tr., p.11, L.19 – p.12, L.2; R., pp.189-90.)  Mr. Jarrett
filed a notice of appeal timely from the district court’s judgment of conviction.  (R., pp.192-94.)
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a sentence of fifteen years, with five
years fixed, and two concurrent sentences of ten years, with five years fixed, following
Mr. Jarrett’s convictions for  one count of sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen years,
and two counts of possession of sexually exploitative material?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Sentence Of Fifteen Years, With
Five Years Fixed, And Two Concurrent Sentences Of Ten Years, With Five Years Fixed,
Following Mr. Jarrett’s Convictions For One Count Of Sexual Abuse Of A Child Under The Age
Of Sixteen Years, And Two Counts Of Possession Of Sexually Exploitative Material
Based on the facts of this case, Mr. Jarrett’s sentences of fifteen years, with five years
fixed, and two concurrent sentences of ten years, with five years fixed, are excessive because
they are not necessary to achieve the goals of sentencing.  When there is a claim that the
sentencing court imposed an excessive sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent
examination of the record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the
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offender, and the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App.
1982).
Independent appellate sentencing examinations are based on an abuse of discretion
standard. State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276 (Ct. App. 2000).  “When an exercise of discretion
is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry. The sequence of the
inquiry  is:   (1)  whether  the  lower  court  rightly  perceived  the  issue  as  one  of  discretion;  (2)
whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any
legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by
an exercise of reason.” State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989) (citation omitted).  When a
sentence is unreasonable based on the facts of the case, it is an abuse of discretion. State v. Nice,
103 Idaho 89, 90 (1982).  Unless it appears that confinement was necessary “to accomplish the
primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given case,” a sentence is unreasonable.
State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982).  Accordingly, if the sentence is excessive,
“under any reasonable view of the facts,” because it is not necessary to achieve these goals, it is
unreasonable and therefore an abuse of discretion. Id.
There are several mitigating factors that illustrate why Mr. Jarrett’s sentence is excessive
under any reasonable view of the facts.  First, Mr. Jarrett is still very young.  He was only 24
when he was arrested in this case.  (PSI, pp.1, 3.)  A defendant’s youth is a long-recognized
mitigating factor. See e.g. State v. Dunnagan, 101 Idaho 125, 126 (1980).
Additionally, Mr. Jarrett was struggling with substance abuse issues and pursuing
treatment  at  the  time  of  these  offenses.   (PSI,  pp.11,  17.)   The  GAIN-I  Recommendation  and
Referral Summary prepared in this case indicated that Mr. Jarrett reported symptoms sufficient to
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meet the criteria for a moderate cannabis use disorder.  (PSI, p.17.)  The summary also indicated
that Mr. Jarrett met “lifetime criteria” for a moderate substance use disorder.  (PSI, p.17.)  A
defendant’s substance abuse should also be considered as mitigating information. State v. Nice,
103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982) (reducing defendant’s sentence, in part, because “the trial court did not
give proper consideration of the defendant’s alcoholic problem, the part it played in causing
defendant to commit the crime [the defendant had been drinking at the time of the offense] and
the suggested alternatives for treating the problem”).
Additionally, as the district court itself noted, “the conduct that went on in this case could
have been much worse . . . .”  (4/18/17 Tr., p.11, Ls.6-7.)  Indeed, as his defense counsel pointed
out, Mr. Jarrett never once met T.S. in person, and there was never any physical contact between
them.  (4/18/17 Tr., p.10, Ls.13-14.)  As such, these offenses were certainly not as serious as
they could have been.  This is another recognized mitigating factor. State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho
293, 295-96 (1997).
Finally, Mr. Jarrett demonstrated remorse at the sentencing hearing.  He said, “I would
just  like to say that I  am sorry for the victim and their  families for having gone through all  of
this.”  (4/18/17 Tr., p.11, Ls.3-5.)  A defendant’s expressions of remorse should also be
considered as mitigating information. State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982) (reducing
sentence of defendant who, inter alia, “expressed regret for what he had done, especially for the
effect it had upon his family and friends, but also indicated that he was confident he could be a
productive citizen in the future”).
Given all the mitigating information in this case, Mr. Jarrett’s sentence was excessive
because it was not necessary to accomplish the goals of sentencing outlined in Toohill. A rider
program or shorter fixed terms would accomplish those goals.  But most importantly, especially
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in light of Mr. Jarrett’s youth, either of those alternatives would give him a chance to engage in
meaningful rehabilitation much sooner than he will be able to with his current sentence.  The
district court did not adequately consider these options or the mitigating information in this case.
Therefore, it abused its discretion because it did not reach its decision through an exercise of
reason or act consistently with the legal standards applicable to its choices regarding sentencing.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Jarrett respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentences as it deems
appropriate.
DATED this 21st day of December, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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